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En este ensayo se discute el manejo de la deuda pública tanto interna como externa en 
Colombia, desde fines de la segunda guerra mundial hasta 1970. De acuerdo con el hilo 
común de anteriores ensayos, dicha experiencia se presenta a la luz del contexto 
internacional. Se muestra cómo el restablecimiento del financiamiento externo después 
de la guerra llegó primeramente en la forma de inversión directa, y no a través de 
canales crediticios, y cómo el apoyo internacional para reducir la carga de la deuda se 
hizo presente una vez más en los años cincuenta y sesenta. En cuanto al endeudamiento 
interno, la exposición explica cómo después de una pausa durante los cincuenta, las 






In this essay, the Colombian experience with internal and external debt since the end of 
the war up to 1970, is discussed. Following a common thread of previous essays, that 
experience is commented in the international context. The document highlights 
important similarities and contrasts between Colombia and the rest of the Latin 
American region. Regarding the external debt, it is shown that the recovery of external 
financing after the war came first in the form of direct investment rather than in foreign 
credits, and how debt relief continued to be a fact of life during the 1950s and 1960s. As 
for internal indebtedness, the article exposits in detail the process by which, after a 
pause during the 1950s, the series of internal debt achieved growth rates relatively high 
during the 1960s. 
 
                                                 
1/  Departamento de Estabilidad Financiera. Subgerencia Monetaria y de Reservas del Banco de la 
República. Bogotá, Colombia, agosto de 2004. Las primeras notas para este ensayo fueron escritas en 
1988 en la Universidad de Glasgow a partir de discusiones con Richard Portes, director del Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, CEPR, en Londres, y CEPREMAP en París, y David Vines de la Universidad 
de Glasgow y del Balliol College en Oxford. Originalmente se emplearon como parte de la 
argumentación histórica de los ensayos requeridos por la tesis doctoral. Este artículo es el noveno de una 
serie acerca de la deuda colombiana desde los 1820 hasta el año 2000. Esta versión del documento fue 
preparada como parte de la agenda de investigación para 2004 de la Gerencia Técnica del Banco de la 
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In this essay, the Colombian experience with internal and external debt since the end of 
the war up to 1970, is discussed. Following a common thread of previous essays, that 
experience is commented in the international context. The document highlights 
important similarities and contrasts between Colombia and the rest of the Latin 
American region. 
  
Regarding the external debt, it is shown that the recovery of external financing after the 
war came first in the form of direct investment rather than in foreign credits, and how 
debt relief continued to be a fact of life during the 1950s and 1960s. The Latin 
American history with debt refunding is reviewed. The exposition also refers to the 
refinancing credits extended to Colombia during the late 1950s. A central point in these 
discussions is that in sharp contrast with the 1930s, international creditors preferred to 
avoid default by means of direct or indirect mechanisms of debt refunding. 
  
As for internal indebtedness the article exposits in detail the process by which, after a 
pause during the 1950s, the series of internal debt achieved high growth rates during the 
1960s. These high rates set off the second cycle of positive rates greater than the trend, 
which were studied in Avella (1988). A particular mention is made of the jump of the 
internal debt series in 1962 and the extraordinary circumstances of the time which 
provoked such upsurge. This document deals with the unprecedented events which 




A. External debt. 
 
 
1. International indebtedness in the aftermath of the war. 
 
 
In her review of international creditors and debtors prepared by the end of World War 
II, Cleona Lewis described "some surprising shifts" which had taken place during and 
due to the conflict. Britain, the ranking creditor country at the beginning of hostilities 
saw her position significantly weakened, the United States seemed to have lost the 
condition of creditor country, and some usually highly indebted countries had improved 
their international financial position. According to rough estimates, Britain repatriated 
25% of her long-term overseas investments, and the United States accumulated short-
term debts to the point that in the aggregate foreign liabilities exceeded foreign 
investments. On the debtors’ side, British Empire countries and Latin America reduced 
their net foreign indebtedness. In the Latin American case, the debt settlements achieved 
by countries like Brazil, Colombia and Mexico improved the long-term position of the 
continent; additionally, the unintended accumulation of dollar exchange in the region   4
reduced the net value of her external debt during the war and allowed long-term debt 
repayments and acquisitions of foreign assets after the war
2. 
 
At the end of the war, the Marshall Plan implied a substantial transfer of U.S. official 
capital to Europe. Direct grants to individual countries amounted to 73.5% of the total 
transfer -US$10.3 billion-; other grants through European monetary institutions came to 
15.5% of the total transfer; and the remaining 11% was represented by loans. Britain, 
France, Germany and Italy were the major beneficiaries with 26%, 20%, 11%, and 10% 
of the total transfer respectively
3. Apart from this extraordinary transfer, Western 
European industrialized countries borrowed heavily between 1945 and 1950. As shown 
in Table 63, the stock of the European external public debt in 1950 was 3.4 times its 
magnitude in 1945. Britain alone was responsible for 57% of the increased 
indebtedness, followed by France with 19%, Holland with 9%, and nine other countries 
with the balance of 15%. At the end of 1950, nearly 75% of the international public 




EXTERNAL PUBLIC LONG-TERM DEBT*
SELECTED  YEARS  1945 - 1958
(Millions of U.S. dollars)
DEBTORS 1945 % 1950 % 1955 %
Europe 3594,8 39,7 12225,2 73,7 14879 61,9
Africa 296,1 3,3 438,5 2,6 1094 4,6
Asia 495,8 5,5 429,5 2,6 2606 10,8
Australia 1760,5 19,4 1288,1 7,8 1412 5,9
Latin America 2911,5 32,1 2213,3 13,3 4046 16,8
TOTAL 9058,7 100 16594,6 100 24037 100
SOURCES.
in America, Abramovic, D. and Gulhati, R.(1958)
For Latin America, United Nations (1965).
1955 and 1958: For all but Latin America, Abramovic, D. and Gulhati, R. (1960)
For Latin America, United Nations (1965).
* External public debt comprises the long- and medium-term owed or guaranteed
by public agencies. Short-term debts with a maturity of less than one year, as 
well as commmittments arising out of drawings on IMF resources are excluded.
Data refers to net contracted loans, and thus cover both disbursed and undisbursed
portions of contracted loans.  
                                                 
2/  Lewis, C (1945), Chapter 2. 
3/ Eichengreen  (1988)  p.140 
4/  The outstanding external public debt of 12 European countries for the years 1945, 1950 and 1955 
appears in Abramovic and Gulhati (1958), p.162 
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The substantial European borrowing in the early postwar years continued well into the 
1950s at an evidently slower rate. In average, Europe concentrated 57.2% of the 
external public long-term debt between 1945 and 1958, in frank contrast with the 
figures for Latin America -20.3%- and Africa -3.8%-. The increased Asian indebtedness 
after 1955 was explained by large reparation obligations assumed by Japan. In 
conclusion, the growth of external public debt during the first three quinquennia after 
World War II was largely determined by the process of European reconstruction, and to 
some extent by the implementation of political settlements at the end of the conflict. 
 
 
2. Main trends in the external public debt of Latin America. 
 
 
Table 64 shows the outstanding external public long-term debt of Latin American 
countries at selected dates between 1945 and 1970
5. Colombia appeared to be the fifth 
most important debtor country during the whole period, behind Brazil, Argentina, 
Mexico and Chile. The predominance of this group was evident since it was responsible 
for 85%, 80% and 76% of the Latin American stock of public long-term debt in 1945, 
1960, and 1970 respectively. The average distribution of liabilities within this group 
was not uniform, however; while Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico individually considered 
accumulated about 20% of the total debt of the region, the relevant percentages for 
Chile and Colombia were 12% and 7%. 
 
 
                                                 
5/  Information in the last two columns of Table 64 corresponds to the net debt actually disbursed. 
The first six columns show the outstanding amounts of net contracted loans (data about disbursed 
amounts is not available), and therefore they include undisbursed balances. It is shown that for 1962 the 
undisbursed portion represented 15% of the contracted sums. 
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TABLE 64
LATIN AMERICA
EXTERNAL PUBLIC LONG-TERM DEBT
1945 - 1970  SELECTED YEARS
(Millions of U.S. dollars)
COUNTRY 1945 1950 1955 1958 1960 1962 1962 2/ 1970 2/
Argentina 900 400 600 1375,1 1478,1 2092,1 1927 1880
Bolivia 61 50 93,1 153 199,8 205,4 171,2 480
Brazil 432,7 409,4 1380,3 1780,8 1823,9 2224,6 2141 3421
Chile 425,9 355,4 350,7 398,6 565,9 741,9 565,4 2067
Colombia 171,4 157,5 276,2 458,9 376,8 638,8 417,7 1297
Costa Rica 14 12 36 40 56,1 84,1 51,2 134
Dominican R 12 10 - 6,2 5,7 36,6 16,6 212
Ecuador 24,2 31,9 67,6 96,7 100,8 121,5 95,4 193
El Salvado 13,4 22,4 28,4 25,5 33,3 51,3 32,7 88
Guatemala 0,9 0,4 22,2 22,2 53,5 67,5 38,5 106
Haiti 15,2 8,3 39,6 43,2 39,7 38 38 40
Honduras 5,4 1,3 4,7 13,8 23,6 39,8 19,1 90
Mexico 540 509,1 478,9 642,9 1038,4 1359,9 1071,2 3196
Nicaragua 5,8 4,6 23,1 24,4 41,1 47,4 28 147
Panama 15,6 13 18,1 41,6 58,4 64,4 44,3 194
Paraguay 15,8 15,3 22,1 19,7 22,3 28,7 18,5 112
Peru 104,8 107,2 229,1 254,6 268,1 500,5 418,8 856
Uruguay 153,4 105,5 126,6 131,2 131,8 150,2 118,4 269
Venezuela - - 249,8 182,6 314,1 361,8 234,8 728
Total 2911,5 2213,3 4046,5 5711 6631,4 8854,5 7447,8 15510
SOURCES.
For all but 1970, United Nations (1965). For 1970, Wilkie, J. (1990).




According to the information in Table 64, the public liability of Latin America grew at 
an annual rate of 7.6% between 1945 and 1970. During the same period, exports grew at 
an average rate of 6.1%. Brazil, Colombia and Mexico showed growth rates of 
indebtedness above the average for the region: 9.3%, 9.1%, and 8.1% respectively. In 
contrast, a major historical debtor, Argentina, exhibited a growth rate of only 3.7%. 
Different individual experiences are screened by these growth rates. While most 
countries tended to reduce their debts between 1945 and 1950, Argentina alone 
explained three quarters of the significant debt reduction -24%- in the region during that 
period. Based on the substantial accumulation of international reserves during the war, 
Latin American countries found the possibility of purchasing foreign assets established 
in the continent, and liquidate part of their external debt. 
 
Some countries which had negotiated readjustment plans before the end of the war, such 
as Brazil, Cuba, Panama and Uruguay were able to resume full debt payments 
comfortably. Chile negotiated a debt plan in 1948 which embraced all her external 
bonds. Colombia and Mexico continued full contract service of the national debt 
renegotiated during the war; additionally, Colombia renegotiated the debt of her   7
departments and cities, and Mexico reached an agreement regarding the debt of the 
National Railways, similar in magnitude to the national dollar debt
6. 
  
The most striking case was protagonized by Argentina. Railways owned by British 
firms and French enterprises were bought by the Argentine government
7. As for 
external debt, all national bonds were called for redemption during 1946. Also 
provinces and municipalities were required to repatriate debt as far as the interest rate 
was higher than the rate fixed for Argentine internal bonds. The important result of 
these measures was that by 1949 all dollar bonds had been called for redemption and 
retired; additionally, all sterling bonds had also been retired by that time, with the 
exception of one of the controversial Roca Agreement Loans of 1933. On a much lower 




The settlements and debt reductions of the first quinquennium of the postwar period 
were followed by two decades of continuous increase in the nominal stock of external 
public debt. This was one of the results of the progressive importance reached by long-
term loans between 1950 and 1970. Table 65 shows how after declining during the first 
five postwar years, long-term loans increased during the 1950s, and finally became the 
predominant source of non-compensatory long-term financing during the 1960s. The 
crucial point is that the recovery of long-term financing to Latin America after the 
interwar defaults took place through direct investments rather than through portfolio 
investments. Between 1946 and 1960, an overwhelming 81.6% of new long-term 
resources flowed in through the channel of direct investments. It was not until the 
1960s, that a clear lead of portfolio long-term loans could be observed. For the period 
1945-1970 as a whole, both inflows were practically equivalent, with US$12.62 billion 




NET INFLOW OF NONCOMPENSATORY LONG-TERM FINANCING
1946 - 1970
(Millions of U.S. dollars)
1946-1950 1951-1960 1961-1970
OFFICIAL LONG-TERM DIRECT OFFICIAL LONG-TERM DIRECT OFFICIAL LONG-TERM DIRECT
COUNTRY DONATIONS LOANS INVESTMENT TOTAL DONATIONS LOANS INVESTMENT TOTAL DONATIONS LOANS INVESTMENT TOTAL
Argentina - -961,8 -113,8 -1075,6 1,2 370,3 844,6 1216,1 -4,1 645 282,6 923,5
Brazil -16 -216,9 219,6 -13,3 35 593 1093 1721 251 2170 1430 3851
Chile 5,1 50,5 41,5 97,1 105,8 16,7 302,2 424,7 54,8 1413,5 126,9 1595,2
Colombia - 6,7 98,9 105,6 14,1 191,5 30,9 236,5 175,5 1126 339,6 1641,1
Mexico 87,5 24 176,9 288,4 19,1 471,6 862,9 1353,6 13 2498 1901 4412
Subtotal I 76,6 -1097,5 423,1 -597,8 175,2 1643,1 3133,6 4951,9 490,2 7852,5 4080,1 12422,8
Peru 6,3 -4,3 23 25 44,3 156 349,4 549,7 248,7 861,9 102,9 1213,5
Venezuela 0,4 -0,8 1026,4 1026 1,4 48,2 1917,5 1967,1 44,8 311,2 84,5 440,5
Subtotal II 6,7 -5,1 1049,4 1051 45,7 204,2 2266,9 2516,8 293,5 1173,1 187,4 1654
Rest 21,8 -57,2 206,4 171 419,1 278,2 492,4 1189,7 608,5 2638,2 750,7 3997,4
TOTAL 105 -1159,8 1678,9 624,2 640 2125,5 5892,9 8658,4 1392,2 11663,8 5018,2 18074,2
SOURCES.
For 1946 - 1960, United Nations (1965).
For 1961 - 1970, Naciones Unidas (1979).  
                                                 
6/  Details available in FBPC (1949) and FBPC (1950). 
7/  United Nations (1964) pp.32-33. 
8/  FBPC (1949) page 2 for Argentina, page 186 for Dominican Republic, and page 235 for Haiti. 
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The inflow of direct investment was far from equally distributed. One country alone, 
Venezuela, concentrated 40% of the new direct investment in the region between 1945 
and 1960, before receding to a secondary position in the 1960s. Other countries such as 
Mexico and Brazil received a more steadily increasing inflow of direct investment. 
Taking the 1945-1970 period as a whole, Mexico and Brazil, in that order, were the 
main beneficiaries of new foreign long-term resources; altogether, they received 42% of 
those resources. Venezuela occupied the third position in spite of the relatively low 
investment during the last decade and the reduced inflow of long-term loans. Colombia 
and Peru were the next beneficiaries having received, altogether, 14% of new foreign 
capitals. Argentina was relegated to a secondary position given the substantial debt 
liquidations of the 1940s. 
  
Regarding the individual Colombian experience, Table 65 shows that during the first 
five postwar years the access of Colombia to long-term external financing was mainly 
obtained through direct investment. Most of this investment was made in oil companies 
by their foreign owners. During the 1950s, direct investments faded while long-term 
loans substantially increased. As we will describe below, important sources of these 
loans were the Ex-Im Bank and the IBRD (World Bank). However, the great inflow of 
noncompensatory long-term financing was to be experienced in the 1960s. In absolute 
terms, Colombia was the third major recipient of long-term funds, only surpassed by 
Mexico and Brazil, but the main recipient within the major debtor countries in 
comparison with the 1950s. This time, it was the International Development Agency 
(IDA) which granted the larger credits to Colombia, followed by the IBRD, and on a 
much lower scale by the Interamerican Development Bank, IDB. 
 
The increasingly significant presence of the continent in long-term credit markets 
reflected the deepening current account deficits of the mid-1950s and mid-1960s. As 
suggested in Graph 1 the deterioration of the Latin American current account balance 
through the 1950s and 1960s was not a steady process. The region started the 1950s 
with a surplus equivalent to 5% of exports; this condition turned into a deficit which 
two years later represented 20% of exports, before coming back to a temporary 
equilibrium position in 1953. What followed was a continuous deterioration of the 
current account until 1962, with the lowest points in 1957-58. A three-year period 
(1963-1965) of lower current account deficits equivalent to about 5.4% of exports 
preceded the second half of the 1960s during which the annual current account deficit 
amounted to 17% of exports. 
 
As for the Colombian experience in relation to the whole region, it can be seen that in 
most years between 1950 and 1962, either the Colombian current account was in 
surplus when that of the continent was in deficit, or the direction -increase or reduction- 
of the deficit was opposite. From 1963 onwards, the Colombian current account balance 
tended to move in a parallel way with the regional one, although the annual figures in 
the Colombian case were much worse than those for the region during most of the time. 
This last evidence about Colombia completes the impression given before that through 
the 1960s the country had increased her indebtedness at a higher speed than Latin 
America as a whole. 
  
    9
  
3. The Colombian case. Contrasts between the 1950s and the 1960s. 
  
  
As indicated by the statistical evidence commented above, the postwar Colombian 
experience with external debt up to 1970 can be referred to two main periods, namely, 
from 1946 to 1961, and from 1962 to 1970. This division is explained not only by the 
relative magnitude of indebtedness in both periods or the identification of the creditors, 
but also by factors of international politics which influenced the amount and ends of 
capital inflows. During the first period, the Colombian case was different from that of 
the rest of major debtors in the region, since although foreign direct investment was 
predominant in 1946-50, long-term loans were the main type of external financing in 
1951-60 when direct investment was still the prevailing capital inflow in Latin America 
(Table 65). 
  
The size of Colombian indebtedness offers a marked contrast between the 1950s and the 
1960s. As reported in Table 66, the nominal value of the external public debt remained 
constant between 1954 and 1960, before the substantial expansion during the new 
decade when the stock of debt multiplied by 6. In Avella (1988), reference is made to 
the 1950s as an "interlude" period during which no more than 4 months of exports were 
required to pay off the external public debt. This was the period of lowest debt-to-export 
ratios between the late 1920s and mid-1980s. 
 
By contrast, the 1960s were a period where the pace of increased indebtedness 
outweighted the expansion of exports to the point that by 1970 the debt-export ratio 
reached the height of 22 months of exports, a figure not seen since the early 1930s. It is 
important to emphasize that contrary to the experience of the late 1920s, it was 
borrowing from official sources that explained the substantial indebtedness of the 
1960s. It is also worth noting that while the increase of debt-export ratios during the 
great depression was largerly explained by falling exports, the increased external debt of 
the 1960s was accompanied by a slow growth of exports most of the time which only 
became more resolute towards the end of the decade. 
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TABLE 66
COLOMBIA
EXTERNAL  PUBLIC  DEBT
1951 - 1970
COMPOSITION BY CREDITORS
(Percentages and total in US$ million)
MULTILATERAL BILATERAL PRIVATE SECTOR
YEAR IBRD IDB OTHER SUB- EX-IM AID SUB- SUB-TOTAL BONDS OTHER SUB-TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
AGENCIES TOTAL BANK TOTAL OFFICIAL LENDERS PRIVATE (Percentage) (US$ Millions)
(1) (2) (1)+(2)=(3) (4) (3)+(4)=(5)
1951 7 - - 7 21,3 - 21,3 28,3 58,2 13,5 71,7 100 141
1952 11,5 - - 11,5 19,8 - 19,8 31,3 41,1 27,6 68,7 100 192
1953 15,3 - - 15,3 15,3 - 15,3 30,6 37,4 32 69,4 100 203
1954 18,3 - - 18,3 14,6 - 14,6 32,9 35,2 31,9 67,1 100 213
1955 19,9 - - 19,9 13,1 - 13,1 33 35 32 67 100 206
1956 27,5 - - 27,5 10,1 - 10,1 37,6 31,7 30,7 62,4 100 218
1957 33 - 4,2 37,2 8,4 - 8,4 45,6 30,2 24,2 54,4 100 215
1958 34,1 - 7,1 41,2 7,1 - 7,1 48,3 28,9 22,8 51,7 100 211
1959 34,8 - 10,3 45,1 6,9 - 6,9 52 27,9 20,1 48 100 204
1960 37,1 - 13,3 50,4 6,2 - 6,2 56,6 25,7 17,7 43,4 100 210
1961 33,2 - 12,7 45,9 24,4 - 24,4 70,3 17,7 12 29,7 100 283
1962 32,9 2 12,5 47,4 19,6 10,8 30,4 77,8 13 9,2 22,2 100 353
1963 33,5 4,7 10,4 48,6 14,4 21,5 35,9 84,5 9,5 6 15,5 100 451
1964 37,4 7,7 10 55,1 9,8 23,2 33 88,1 7,2 4,7 11,9 100 530
1965 36,8 8,3 10,6 55,7 8,2 27 35,2 90,9 5,8 3,3 9,1 100 601
1966 34,2 9,6 12 55,8 6,3 30,7 37 92,8 4,5 2,7 7,2 100 710
1967 32,9 11,3 11,6 55,8 6 33 39 94,8 3,6 1,6 5,2 100 803
1968 30,9 11,7 10,1 52,7 5,4 36,2 41,6 94,3 2,7 3 5,7 100 940
1969 27,8 12,2 10 50 4,9 36,5 41,4 91,4 2 6,6 8,6 100 1124
1970 26,8 13,5 9,3 49,6 4,2 37,1 41,3 90,9 1,6 7,5 9,1 100 1319
SOURCES.
IBRD and Ex Im Bank. Series reconstructed since the 1940s based on FBPC, annual reports.
es according to the IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook.
Bonds. Series based on FBPC, annual reports.
Rest of series. IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook.  
 
 
Additional contrasts between the 1950s and the 1960s are offered by the composition of 
the external public debt of Colombia by class of creditors. As seen, the traces of the era 
of bond finance were still clear at the beginning of the 1950s, since long-term bonds 
purchased by the foreign private sector accounted for nearly 60% of the stock of debt. 
By that time, all those securities were being fully served and expected to be completely 
amortized in the early 1970s; as shown, by 1970 the bonded debt represented an 
insignificant amount of the public debt. Foreign private finance predominated in the 
composition of public debt during the 1950s, although this result very much depended 
on the still high weight of bonds. However, during the first half of the fifties, private 
credits amounted to some 28% of the stock of public debt.  
 
The relatively low access of Colombia to official foreign funds during the 1950s is 
confirmed by the fact that only 47% of the noncompensatory long-term financing 
during 1951-60 -US$191.5 million according to Table 65- was borrowed from official 
institutions, while the relevant percentages for other major debtors such as Brazil and 
Mexico were 73% and 56% respectively. For Latin America as a whole the figure was 
70%, far above the Colombia's case. Regarding the composition of official borrowing, 
Colombia also behaved differently from the rest of the region; while Latin America 
obtained 38% of her official borrowing from multilateral entities, and 62% from U.S. 
official agencies, Colombia borrowed 83% from multilateral institutions and only 17% 
from U.S. bilateral organizations
9. 
 
The access of Colombia to multilateral lending started in 1949 when an IBRD mission 
headed by Lauchlin Currie considered Colombia as a "pilot country" for future loans. 
During the 1950s, only three countries, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico were granted 61% 
of actual IBRD disbursements; Colombia got a share of 16%, while Brazil and Mexico, 
                                                 
9/  Calculations based on United Nations (1964) p.137 
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23% and 22% respectively
10. Regarding the U.S. bilateral lending, its main channel 
during the 1950s was the credit of the Ex-Im Bank
11. Brazil which had been the main 
recipient of Ex-Im Bank loans since the debt renegotiations in the early 1940s, was 
again the focus of major inflows; a great deal of these loans were geared toward the 
repayment of large trade arrears accumulated by Brazil at the beginning of the 1950s. 
As a result of these operations, Brazil received 44% of the loans, far above Mexico and 
Argentina with 16% each, and Colombia with 8%. These four countries made part of 




The predominance of the official component in the stock of public debt was clear since 
1960. The launching of the Alliance of Progress and the creation of the AID in 1961 had 
a catalytic effect on the substantial increase of external loans to Colombia. The 
indebtedness with the IBRD alone was to represent one-third of the stock of debt during 
the new decade. Multilateral institutions as a whole prevailed over a half of the public 
debt, and the AID substantial lending since 1962 brought about substantial changes in 
the composition of debt by creditors. Table 66 shows how the AID loans alone came to 
represent 30% of the external public debt by 1966, and by 1970 the figure was close to 
40%. It is also seen how towards the end of the decade the most active sources of loans 
were the AID and the IDB; by 1970, 50% of the external public debt was in the hands of 
these two institutions. As a whole, the official component became more than 90% of 
public debt during the second quinquennium of the 1960s. 
 
 
4. Debt relief in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
 
The settlements of the 1940s and the recovery of external financing to Latin America 
after the war did not mean that debt problems in the region were over. Debt relief was a 
fact of life during the 1950s and 1960s, although in contrast with previous periods 
refunding arrangements were made to prevent default from happening rather than to 
restore regular payments. A common factor of the new arrangements was the active 
presence of either bilateral or multilateral institutions. There was a diversity of 
refunding methods ranging from the indirect procedures of balance of payments loans to 




a. Latin American experiences. 
 
 
                                                 
10/  Based on Wilkie, James (1990) 
11/  It has to be considered that at the end of World War II, most of the credit of the Bank was 
concentrated in Europe and Latin America with 46% and 39% respectively. At that time, Brazil, the major 
debtor in the region, already concentrated 26% of the Bank authorized credits to the continent. During the 
first quinquenium after the war, European countries -particularly France and the United Kingdom-, tried 
to maintain their share in the Bank lending while Asian countries led by Japan doubled their share from 
9% to 18%; in this context, Latin America saw her share to fall to 30%. Due in great part to loans granted 
for refunding purposes, Latin America increased their share through the 1950s, reaching 36% by 1957. 
FBPC ([1945],[1950],[1957]). 
12/  United Nations (1964) p.209   12
Countries such as Argentina and Brazil underwent a variety of debt problems during the 
1950s and 1960s
13. Argentina required refinancing credits in 1950 and 1958 from the 
Ex-Im Bank and commercial banks respectively, to liquidate commercial arrears. 
Importantly, debt renegotiations with European countries in the mid-1950s led to the 
creation of the "Paris Club" (May 1956), by which outstanding debts with individual 
European creditors were consolidated and payments were multilateralized. Further 
experiences of debt relief during the 1960s were carried out with the support of the 
IMF, the U.S. Treasury, the AID and the Ex-Im Bank. Under this foreign tutelage 
Argentina managed to roll over its external debt through the 1960s and keep up service 
payments. 
 
The Brazilian experience is also illustrative. By 1952, commercial arrears amounted to 
some US$950 million or 70% of exports. Apart from refinancing agreements with 
individual creditors, the country received combined loans from the Ex-Im Bank and 
commercial banks during the first half of the 1950s to liquidate the accumulated short-
term debts. In the early 1960s, a new cycle of piling-up commercial arrears led to 
simultaneous operations of consolidation and refinancing. The former was agreed with 
European creditors through the "Hague Club" (May 1961), and the second with U.S. 
creditors after funds were made available by the Ex-Im Bank. Later deterioration of the 
Brazilian debt situation resulted in new refinancing programs with the active 
participation of the U.S. government, and also in new debt consolidations. Only by 
means of these debt relief operations was Brazil able to meet its external obligations 
during the 1950s and the 1960s. 
  
Other important Latin American debtors also required debt relief programs. Chile 
obtained refinancing credits in the early 1960s, and a consolidation of debts through the 
Paris Club was achieved in 1965. Peru also required refunding in the late 1960s, but the 
preferred method was that of individual agreements with creditors and new borrowing 
transactions to liquidate existing individual debts, rather than overall refinancing or 
consolidation operations. Finally, Colombia was not an exemption from debt relief 
programs. Characteristically, Colombia experienced an important refinancing operation 
during the second half of the 1950s, but no direct debt refunding was required during 




b. Refinancing credits to Colombia. 
  
  
The Colombian economy lived through an expansionary cycle during most of the first 
half of the 1950s (Table 67). From the bottom of 1.8% in 1951, the growth rate went up 
to an average of 6.5% in 1953-55. A bonanza of coffee prices was at the center of the 
boom. The New York spot prices climbed up from an average of US$33.4 cents per 
pound in 1944-47 to US$57.2 cents per pound in 1950-53. However, the major 
increases were registered in 1954-57 when the average quotation reached the figure of 
US$70.6 cents per pound. Total exports of the country increased pari passu with the 
value of coffee exports between 1950-53 and 1954-57. Imports increased as well, and 
what is more important, at a higher speed than exports. More precisely, imports jumped 
                                                 
13/  This review of Latin American experiences heavily draws on Bittermann (1973). 
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in 1954, coinciding with the year in which coffee prices achieved their maximum values 
during the coffee bonanza, and stayed at that high level until 1956. As a result of this 
behaviour of exports and imports, the stock of international reserves nearly doubled 







GDP 1/ INFLATION 2/ EXPORTS IMPORTS TRADE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE NOMINAL REAL
YEAR (FOB) (CIF) BALANCE RESERVES PRICE EXCHANGE EXCHANGE
RATE RATE
1951 1,8 8 484,3 419 65,3 137,8 58,7 2,39 59,6
1952 3,1 -2,3 483 415,4 67,6 167,2 57 2,51 66
1953 6,3 7,3 605,5 546,7 58,8 202,7 59,9 2,51 62,1
1954 6,1 8,8 669,1 671,8 -2,7 269,6 79,9 2,51 57,6
1955 7 0,2 596,7 669,3 -72,6 152,6 64,4 2,51 57,8
1956 3,8 5,5 551,6 657,2 -105,6 144,2 74 2,51 56
1957 4,1 17,4 511,1 482,6 28,5 157 64 5,06 99,2
1958 3,6 13,2 460,7 399,9 60,8 172,8 52,3 6,41 114,9
1959 2,5 8,2 473 415,6 57,4 230,4 45,2 6,4 107,6
1960 7,2 5,7 464,6 518,6 -54 178,4 44,9 6,65 107,7
1961 4,3 8,5 434,5 557,1 -122,7 170,6 43,6 6,7 101,8
1962 5,1 4,3 463,4 540,4 -76,9 115,8 40,8 6,78 101,5
1963 5,4 27,3 446,7 506 -59,4 124,6 39,6 9 108,4
1964 3,3 17,7 548,1 586,3 -38,2 147,2 48,8 9 94,1
1965 6,2 7,1 539,1 453,5 85,6 145,3 48,5 10,12 105,6
1966 3,6 16,7 507,6 674,1 -166,6 144,1 47,4 11,25 120,6
1967 5,4 8,1 509,9 496,9 13 149,4 41,9 14,73 123,3
1968 4,2 7,4 558,3 643,3 -85 217,7 42,6 16,39 134,1
1969 6,1 6,9 607,5 685,3 -77,8 257,3 44,9 17,37 140,7
1970 6,6 6,7 736 843 -107 257,5 18,44 146,9
NOTES
rate of growth of GDP.
thly annual inflation rates.
Coffee price and exchange rates as in Table 57.




The import surplus which in 1954 appeared to be of a negligible magnitude according to 
Table 67, by 1956 represented 20% of exports. The upsurge of imports was financed not 
only by the export boom and the decline of international reserves, but by an 
unprecedented accumulation of trade debts. According to a contemporary survey of the 
ECLA, trade debts grew steadily during 1954-56. The accumulation of these debts 
represented 22% of exports in 1954, 41% in 1955, and 73% in 1956
14. What did 
authorities do when faced with this problem?  
  
Initially, the government treated the situation as a liquidity problem which could be 
partially solved by an exchange transaction with the IMF. Following this line of action, 
in December 1954 Colombia purchased US$25 million from the Fund resources with 
Colombian pesos
15. More decisive measures were not adopted until the second half of 
                                                 
14/  ECLA (1958), p.152 
15/  FBPC (1954), p.81 
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1956. The government tried different schemes some times for facilitating the payment 
of commercial arrears, and other times for controlling imports. In the first case, 
authorities were ready to provide foreign exchange for immediate payment to pressing 
creditors under the condition that importers purchased at least 50% of the required 
foreign exchange in the free market. In the second case, the government went to the 
extreme of closing the office for registering imports, and creating an ad-hoc committee 
for extremely urgent requests.  
  
In the meantime, the nominal exchange rate depreciated in the free market for dollars; 
while the official rate continued at the level of C$2.51=US$1, fixed since 1951, the free 
market quotation of the dollar evolved from C$4.13 in December 1955 to C$6.83 in 
December 1956. Authorities then intervened (December 1956), to create a market for 
foreign exchange certificates seeking to take the place of the free market, and therefore 
importers of non-essential goods were bound to pay rates substantially above the 
official rate. Finally, imports were also discouraged by raised stamp taxes and higher 
prior deposits. 
  
These measures were the precedent of more radical policies during 1957. The fact is 
that imports repeated the high level of 1954 in 1955 and 1956, and a clear solution for 
the unprecedented accumulation of trade debts was not available. It was not that the 
market was not providing a solution for this problem. For instance, before the 
celebration of agreements in 1957, U.S. exporters and commercial banks had made 
US$56 million available to clear up existing debts. However, this amount represented 
no more than 11.4% of the outstanding commercial debts
16. 
  
In March 1957, an agreement was achieved with U.S. creditors, according to which 
60% of the outstanding debt estimated in US$235 million -Table 68- was to be paid in 
cash, and the remaining 40% in promissory notes. This agreement excluded relatively 
small debts, which were to be fully repaid by cash, and some payments which were to 
be made in Colombian pesos. The main peso payments equivalent to US$80 million 
were made to Colombian importers who had previously purchased dollars in the free 
market in order to pay their commercial debts but still had exchange permits. The 
payments were made by the Stabilization Fund (Fondo de Estabilización), by means of 
an extraordinary loan of the Bank of the Republic. Later, in the 1960s, such debt would 
be recognized as part of the internal public debt
17. 
 
In spite of the refinancing agreement with U.S. creditors and the measures adopted since 
1956 to discourage imports, Colombia's standing in foreign financial markets continued 
to decline. It has been documented that by mid-1957 it was difficult for importers to 
have access to customary trade credits. Some foreign institutions expressed their 
                                                 
16/  FBPC (1957), p.101. The information about the total outstanding commercial debt, US$493.2 
million is from IGBR (1960), p.159 
17/  As commented in Avella (1988), the Stabilization Fund was created in the 1930s to help stabilize 
the market for public debt. In July 1957, the Fund was authorized to purchase exchange permits in the 
hands of the importers. At that time the exchange rate in the market for foreign exchange certificates was 
C$5.8=US$1, and the average rate for 1956 had been C$4.95. The Fund offered this last rate to the 
importers which implied an excess of C$2.44 above the official exchange rate -C$2.50 per dollar- and a 
stamp tax of C$0.01. Later, the government (Decree 088 of 1958) accepted the responsibility for the debt 
of the Fund to the Bank of the Republic, but a formal registration of it in the internal public debt 
accountancy was not made until 1966. IGBR (1963) and IGBR (1967). 
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reserves about financing exports to Colombia; for example, the Export Credit Guarantee 
Department of Great Britain decided to interrupt insurance covers on exports to 
Colombia as a precaution against non-repayment
18. The Bank of the Republic also 
recognized the adverse effect of the delay of commercial payments on the access of the 
country to international credit during 1956 and first half of 1957
19. 
  
Facing a shaking creditworthiness of the country in foreign financial centers and a 
heavy burden of short-term debts, authorities launched a new package of measures with 
two main focuses of attention: an exchange reform, and a conversion of short-term 
external liabilities into medium-term debts. A central aspect of the exchange reform 
(June 1957), was the instauration of two fluctuating markets, the certificate market for 
most merchandises, and the free market for most service and capital transactions. The 
exchange rate then depreciated in the certificate market from the old official quotation 
of C$2.51 per dollar to C$4.86 in June, before gradually depreciating to C$5.38 in 
December and C$6.82 in June 1958. This evolution of the nominal exchange rate 
represented a devaluation of 172% in one year. As for the real exchange rate, Table 67 
shows how by 1956 the peso was overvalued in 44% with reference to the 1935 parity 
level, and how by 1957 such an overvaluation had been nearly corrected. A similar 
information was offered in Graph 8 in Avella (1988) where the 1957 devaluation closed 
a long cycle of real exchange rates growing below their historical trend. 
 
                                                 
18/  ECLA (1958) p.153 
19/  IGBR (1957) p.141 
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TABLE 68
 








I. Agreements with creditors 
 
A. Amortization agreement with U.S. creditors, March  
 1957. 
 
Amount: US$235 m 
Cash payments (60%): US$141 m 
Promissory Notes (40%): US$94 m 
Amortization period: 30 monthly payments starting  
in April 1957. Interest rate: 4%. 
 
B. Amortization agreement with European creditors, July  
1957. 
 
 Amount: US$36 m 
 Cash payments (20%): US$7.2 m 
Promissory Notes (80%): US$28.8 m 
 Amortization: 36 monthly payments starting in  
 February 1959. Interest rate: 5% 
  
  
II. Bank loans 
  
A. Export-Import Bank 
US$60 m (July 1957) 
Amortization: n.a. 
   Interest rate: 5 1/2% 
 US$78 m (June 1958) 
Amortization: five equal annual payments between  
   1962 and 1966. Interest rate: 5% 
 
B. Commercial Banks 
 US$27 m (July 1957) 
 Amortization: n.a. 
Interest rate: n.a. 
 US$25 m (June 1958) 
   Amortization: Six semi-annual instalments 
   Interest rate: 5%. 
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Sources. I.A. Agreement with U.S. creditors. ECLA (1958, p.153) 
     I.B. Agreement with European creditors. 
     Bittermann (1973, p.204). 




The exchange reform was complemented by tax measures over exports (15%) and 
imports (10%), and by new tough actions destined to restrict imports. Apart from 
establishing lists of prohibited, licensed and free imports, the reform created uniform 
advance deposits which were equal to 20% initially, but later were increased to 100% 
for four-fifths of imports. As a whole, the exchange reform sought to restore the 




As for the extension of foreign exchange liabilities, authorities attempted to substitute 
medium-term debts for their immediate debts. The central operation was a credit pool of 
US$113 million set up in June-July 1957. The first movement was the arrangement of a 
stand-by credit of US$25 million with the IMF. The main step was, however, the 
negotiation of an Ex-Im Bank loan for US$60 million supplemented by a credit of 
US$27 million given by a group of U.S. commercial banks (Table 68)
21. This 
negotiation was followed by bilateral agreements with Belgium, France, Germany, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom, to refinance US$36 million of trade debts. 
Contrasting with the agreement with U.S. creditors, this one provided that only 20% 
should be paid in cash and the remainder in 36 instalments starting in 1959
22. These 
agreements were supplemented by borrowing operations with the domestic private 
sector which reached the amount of US$31 million
23. 
 
The package of measures not only mitigated the short-term debt burden but brought 
about a significant reduction of imports. As seen in Table 67, in only 1957 imports fell 
by 27%, and by 1958 the overall decline of imports with respect to 1956 reached the 
figure of 40%. As a result, the negative trade balances of 1953-56 were followed by 
trade surpluses during the rest of the decade, in spite of the poor performance of 
exports. However critical, the measures adopted were still insufficient. New estimates of 
the accumulated trade debts in early 1958 revealed that they could represent about 90% 
of exports
24. On top of this, a new downswing of coffee prices which would last until 
1963 was well under way.  
                                                 
20/  Revista del Banco de la Republica, July 1957, p.783 
21/  The Bank of the Republic received from the Ex-Im Bank two credits in July 1957, one for 
US$20.3 million, and the other for US$39.8 million for refinancing purposes. They were outstanding in 
the amount of US$53 million at the end of 1957. FBPC (1957) p.100 
22/  Bittermann (1973) p.204. The European creditors also accepted that about additional US$10 
million could be paid with coffee remittances. As a whole, the negotiation with European creditors 
reached some $46 million. IGBR (1958), pp.40-42, 144. 
23/  The International Petroleum Company (Colombia) accepted 48 monthly non-interest bearing 
Promissory Notes for a credit of US$18.5 million, the Gran-Colombian Fleet extended a loan for US$7.8 
million, and the banking system a loan for US$5.3 million. IGBR (1958), pp.40-42. 
24/  Optimistic estimates revealed that commercial debts represented US$450 million in the early 
part of 1958 (FBPC [1957] p.101) which amounted to 88% of exports in 1957. 
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The prospect of an immediate serious shortage of foreign exchange led authorities to 
arrange new external credits. A new inflow of medium-term capital for US$103 million 
was made available in June 1958. This time, the Ex-Im Bank provided US$78 million, 
and a syndicate of 13 American commercial banks the remaining US$25 million. The 
Ex Im Bank credit was to be received in 12 monthly instalments of US$6.5 million 
intended to sustain a minimum level of imports. The repayment was divided in five 
annual instalments of US$15.6 million between 1962 and 1966. Such repayments as 
well as the first refinancing credit received from the Ex Im Bank were to be financed 
with the proceeds of the 15% tax on exports created in June 1957. As for the 
commercial banks credit, it was to be repayed in six semi-annual instalments (Table 68). 
  
What became the end of these attempts to liquidate the commercial arrears accumulated 
by Colombia between 1954 and 1957? The settlement and repayment of the commercial 
debts were practically accomplished between 1957 and 1959. According to Table 69, 
the accumulated short-term debts arrived to US$493.2 million of which two-thirds were 
repayed by cash, and the remaining one-third by promissory notes. As for the 
composition of the inflow of refinancing credits and the substitution of medium-term 
for short-term obligations, the table is also informative. As seen, nearly two-thirds of 
the funds were provided by the Ex Im Bank, and while 70% of the resources lent by 
commercial banks had to be repayed during the first two years, 86% of the Ex Im Bank 
loans was repayed during the 1960s. In conclusion, the liquidation of commercial 
arrears was carried out between 1957 and 1959, and two thirds of the short-term debts 




                                                 
25/  For every dollar of short-term debt, 54 cents were converted in medium-term debt due to the Ex-
Im Bank loans, and 12 cents were also converted in medium-term debt as a result of the bank syndicate 
loans. 
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TABLE 69
 








I. Repayment of commercial debts. Period 1957-1959 
 
A. Cash payments in Colombian pesos   106.2    21.5 % 
B. Cash payments in U.S. dollars     223.2    45.3 % 
C. Promissory notes in U.S. dollars     163.8    33.2 % 




II. Disbursements and repayments of foreign refinancing credits. 
 
A. Disbursements in 1957-1959 
  
   Ex Im Bank         138.0     62.9 % 
   Commercial Banks       81.3     37.1 % 




1. Period 1957-1959 
 
Ex  Im  Bank       19.0     25.4  % 
Commercial  Banks    55.9     74.6  % 
Total       74.9   100.0% 
 
2. Period 1960-1966 
 
Ex  Im  Bank      119.0   82.4  % 
Commercial  Banks       25.4   17.6  % 





I. IGBR (1959-1960) p.159 
II. IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook, annual issue.   
 
 
B. Internal debt. 
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As in the case of the external debt, there were marked contrasts between the experience 
with internal debt in the 1950s and the 1960s. In Avella (1988) it was observed how 
during the first decade internal debt grew at rates less than the historical trend, while 
during the second decade, the growth rates of internal debt substantially exceeded the 
trend. Government revenues and expenditures behaved differently during the two 
periods. Through most of the 1950s, revenues grew above their trend; expenditures also 
grew above their trend but only in the first half of the decade, before a government 
expenditure retrenchment led to growth rates below the trend during the second half. 
Things were different in the 1960s. During the first half of the decade, revenues grew 
well below their normal rate while the stop-go policies of the time led expenditures to 
grow first well above the trend and then clearly below that trend. It was in this period 
that the growth rates of internal debt achieved their maximum values during the decade. 
Finally, the increasing growth rates of government expenditures in the second half of 




1. Changes in the structure of internal debt after the war. 
 
 
With a few exceptions, the composition of internal debt during the first half of the 
1950s was a reflection of the structure brought into being during World War II. The 
conversion bonds issued in 1941-1942 -the UIND and the Salt Mines conversion bonds- 
and the securities issued to finance the fiscal deficits during war time were still the main 
outstanding bonds in 1955. They represented 70% of bonds in circulation, and 37% of 
the stock of internal debt. Apart from launching additional bonds to finance railway and 
housing projects, there was no other noteworthy change in the existing bonds during the 
first half of the decade (Table 70,I.).  
  
There were changes, however, in the government debt with the Bank of the Republic, 
which anticipated what would be a characteristic experience of the 1960s. As 
government expenditures grew at a greater speed than government revenues during the 
coffee bonanza of 1954-1956, the primary deficit was partially financed by borrowing 
from the central bank (Tables 70, III.A, and 71). During these years, the loans to the 
government represented some 11% of total loans of the central bank, a proportion not 
seen since the reflationary loans of the 1930s were transformed into central bank 
investments in 1942 (Section IV A, above). 
  
In 1956, the government carried out a new conversion of outstanding bonds similar to 
that of 1941-1942. The operation was intended to simplify the existing structure 
characterized by multiple interest rates and terms to maturity. A new security, the 5% 
Consolidated National Bond with a redemption period of 20 years was issued to 
consolidate a debt mainly inherited from the 1940s. By the end of 1956 bondholders had 
accepted the new bond for the amount of C$317 million in exchange for their old bonds. 
This amount represented 83% of the bonds in circulation, so by the end of the year the 
outstanding bonds were practically reduced to the Consolidated National Bond and the 
Salt Mines Conversion Bonds issued in 1942 (Table 70). In practical terms, apart from 
the simplification of the structure, the government got an extension of the terms to   21
maturity, and the average interest rate on government bonds showed a slight decline in 




INTERNAL  PUBLIC  DEBT
1951 - 1959
(Millions of Pesos)
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
I. BONDS
A. Development Bonds 9 7,6 7 6,4 5,8 - - - 70
B. Conversion Bonds (UIND)
6% Class A 31,4 30,4 29,4 28,3 27,2 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2
4% Class B 18,3 17,3 16,3 15,2 14,1 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3
C. Salt Mines Conversion Bonds
4% Class A 32,6 33,6 32,4 31,1 29,8 29,2 28,7 27,3 44,7
3% Class B 33,7 34,5 33,1 31,7 30,2 29,6 28,9 27,3 43,6
D. ^6% National Economic Defense 18,6 13,5 9,7 5,9 2,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2
ury Colombian Bonds
6% 1944 Bonds 22,1 21,7 21,1 20,6 20,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
6% 1945 Bonds 45,3 44,4 43,4 42,5 41,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2
pal Development Bonds
Classes A-E, 1940-1944 2,7 2,6 2,4 2,4 2,3
Classes F-I, 1945-1948 16,6 15,9 15,2 14,4 13,6 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2
Railway Bonds 8 30 28,3 33,3 27,1 2,2
Loans Institute Bonds 13,2 0,5 29,3 27,5 26,1 3,4 2,2 1,8 1,7
I. Agrarian Bonds 10,4 10,1 9,9 9,6 9,4
lidated National Bonds 316,6 416,4 402 387,3
al Internal Debt 1945/57 70 63
 Other Bonds 9,3 6,8 4,5 3,8 2,7 0,5 0,2





1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
PROMISSORY NOTES
A. Public Works 0,3 7,3 7,3 7,3 7
rder and Rehabilitation 100 90 80 90
C. Other Promissory Notes 5,5 5,2 54,1
- Promissory Notes 0,3 7,3 12,8 12,5 61,1 100 90 80 90
III. FINANCIAL SYSTEM LOANS
A. Bank of the Republic 31,6 75 106,3
B. Other Financial Institutions 11,7 13,9 16,2 14,4 14,9 31,1 31,9
C. Total - Financial System Loans 11,7 13,9 16,2 46 89,9 106,3 31,1 31,9
IV. FLOATING DEBT 57,1 59,6 61,5 186,4 59 12,8 16,2 7,1 40,9
V. TOTAL INTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT 340,3 349,4 372,7 517,6 462 601,7 583,7 647,8 774,3
SOURCES.
Informe Financiero del Contralor. Annual Report.  
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During the second half of the 1950s, the rhythm of growth of fiscal revenues outstripped 
the rhythm of growth of expenditures so a primary surplus characterized these years. 
There was no need of new credits from the central bank and the outstanding debt was 
paid off (Table 70, III. A.). These facts did not mean that internal debt did not grow 
during the period. Actually, the outstanding bonds in circulation increased by 60% 
while the total internal debt went up by only 29%. These figures indicate that authorities 
substituted new bond issues for the former credits from the central bank. In this context, 
authorities launched the 8% National Internal Debt Bonds of 1958 to complete the 
liquidation of the 1957 fiscal deficit. 
  
Authorities also issued new securities to finance specific projects. Some of them were 
initially considered of a temporary character, such as programs of public order and 
rehabilitation (Table 70, II. B). Programs orientated to the promotion of economic 
development were also initiated during the late 1950s and financed with Development 
Bonds and new issues of the Salt Mines Conversion Bonds (Table 70, I.A., and I.C.). As 
a whole, the bond issues of the second half of the fifties preanounced what would be 
characteristic of the sixties, namely, the issue of public bonds to finance specific 
projects, apart from the financing of budget deficits. Finally, the bond issues of the late 
1950s marked an inflection point regarding the evolution of interest rates since the 
government had to accept new increases in the average rate in contrast with the 
reductions achieved in the first half of the decade (Table 71). 
  
  
2. Twin deficits and the shape of public debt during the 1960s. 
  
  
After the coffee bonanza (1954-1956) and the crisis of commercial debts (1956-1957), 
the Colombian economy lived through a period of relative stability between 1958 and 
1961 (Tables 67 and 71). It was possible for the economy to grow at the historical rate 
with declining rates of inflation. A tight monetary policy resulted in decreasing rates of 
monetary expansion. As for the fiscal sector, although budget surpluses were achieved 
in 1958 and 1959, deficits reappeared since 1960. In spite of relatively restrictive 
government expenses, surpluses could not survive given the increasing weakness in the 
growth rates of government revenues
26. Regarding the external sector, coffee prices 
tended to stabilize in 1959-1960 after a 30% collapse between 1956 and 1958. Since 
exports barely grew between 1958 and 1960, the sharp recovery of imports prompted by 
import liberation measures in 1959 ended up in new trade deficits since 1960. 
  
The outbreak of twin deficits since 1960 shaped the structure of internal public debt 
during the decade. There was trade deficit during the whole decade with the exception 
of 1965 and 1967, and there was also budget deficit in all years but 1966 and 1967. 
Additionally, there was current account deficit during the whole decade. Regarding the 
trade balance, the most critical years were 1961 and 1966 when it represented 28% and 
33% of exports respectively. In the latter year, the external current account deficit 
amounted to 54% of exports. As for the budget deficit, it has to be recalled that as a 
proportion of GDP the negative outcomes of the first half of the 1960s had a pale 
                                                 
26//  The average growth rate of 22.7% of government expenditures for the three years 1958-1960 
was inferior to the average growth rate of 25.6% since the end of the war, excluding the extraordinary 
retrenchment of 1956-1957. 
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precedent only during the boom of the late 1920s (Graph 13 in Avella, 1988). At its 
highest points in 1961 and 1962, the primary budget deficit represented 1.8% and 2.6% 
of the GDP respectively. For the first half of the 1960s the average primary budget 




FISCAL AND FINANCIAL INDICATORS
PERIOD 1951 - 1969
(C$ Million)
PERCENTAGE OF MONEY BASE
YIELD ON MONEY (1) (2)
CURRENT CURRENT PRIMARY GOVERNMENT SUPPLY NET NET
INCOME EXPENDITURE DEFICIT BONDS (Growth INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT
YEARS % Rate) RESERVES LOANS
1951 586 483 103 5,13 16,4 36,9 16,9
1952 710 637 73 5,14 16,9 38 15,2
1953 764 773 -9 4,92 18,3 42,5 25,3
1954 906 992 -86 4,94 19,3 46,7 19,6
1955 1250 1369 -119 4,95 4,7 25,7 36,2
1956 1190 1364 -174 4,76 24,9 26,2 49,2
1957 1312 1113 199 4,81 13,6 10,3 64,1
1958 1616 1448 168 5,2 20,9 -5,6 52
1959 1833 1688 145 5,1 12 2,6 57,1
1960 1982 2044 -62 5,44 10,4 5,4 50,5
1961 1908 2451 -543 5,96 24,6 -3,9 52,6
1962 2307 3113 -806 6,36 20,7 -30 95
1963 3069 3679 -610 6,03 12,2 -28,9 68,7
1964 3847 4292 -445 6,4 20,9 -24,4 63,3
1965 3948 4157 -209 6,27 15,7 -9 80,8
1966 6028 5725 303 6,47 14 -13 67,2
1967 6688 6675 13 6,54 21,9 -5,8 68,1
1968 8194 8493 -299 6,65 14,8 6,2 49,9
1969 9581 10057 -476 6,9 19,5 14,4 37,2
SOURCES.
Interest rate on government bonds. Weighted average of rates
published by IGBR (1969).
Rest: IMF, International Financial Statistics.  
 
 
3. The "jump" in internal public debt accounts in 1962. 
 
 
The impact of the twin deficits on the configuration of the internal public debt was clear 
since 1962. Besides, a big jump in the series of internal public debt was produced this 
year. This huge increase of the stock of debt was both the highest and the starting point 
of the positive cycle of internal debt during the sixties (Graph C-1 in Avella, 1988). In 
1962 only, the nominal value of internal debt jumped from C$1264.1 million to 
C$3690.7 million, equivalent to a twofold increase of the stock of debt. The two main 
sources of this extraordinary increase were the financing of the budget deficits of 1961 
and 1962, and the transformation of losses of the central bank in the exchange market 
into government obligations with the bank. These main sources were reinforced in 1962 
by operations of conversion of external obligations into internal debt.   24
  
In practical terms, the financing of the budget deficits of 1961 and 1962 took the form 
of consolidation of a backlog of short-term debts of the Treasury accumulated since 
1961. The government issued promissory notes for the amount of C$962.3 million of 
which 87% corresponded to obligations originated during 1962
27. Who bought these 
promissory notes which offered a 4% yield, well below the 6.4% average government 
bonds rate? The Bank of the Republic was authorized to buy the whole issue without 
affecting the legal quota of the government in the Bank
28. In this way, the government 
achieved the immediate liquidation of the Treasury's backlog, and the Bank of the 
Republic financed the deficit not through the direct mechanism of credits, but indirectly 
through increased investments in government bonds. 
  
The other major source of huge increases in the internal debt was the losses experienced 
by the central bank in stabilizing foreign exchange operations. These stabilizing 
operations were carried out after a devaluation of the national currency which increased 
the domestic price of the U.S. dollar from C$6.81 to C$9.00 in November 1962. This 
was thought to be the appropriate remedy for the correction of the external 
disequilibrium
29. The losses originated in such operations were registered in the Special 
Exchange Account (defined previously in Avella, 1988) and charged to the public debt. 
In December 1962 the addition to the public debt for this concept reached C$444.5 
million equivalent to 46% of the amount of bonds in circulation, and to 12% of the total 
internal debt. 
  
To close the scene, credits granted to the government by the Ex Im Bank were partially 
repaid by the Bank of the Republic, giving origin to a new increase in the internal public 
debt, this time for C$455.6 million. Altogether, the three sources just discussed 
amounted to an extraordinary increase of C$1862.4 million in the nominal amount of 
internal public debt during 1962, equivalent to 1.5 times the outstanding stock at the end 
of 1961. On top of these extraordinary changes, new issues of bonds destined to finance 
specific projects made up the increase of internal public debt in 1962. 
  
Given the exceptional magnitude of the change of internal debt in 1962, the series of 
annual changes exhibits an extreme value during that year. In our econometric 
discussions one of the estimated models considered the annual real changes of internal 
debt (as a share of GDP) as the dependent variable. The path of this variable -
reproduced in Avella, 1988- presents an extremely high point in 1962, representing 7% 
of GDP when the average absolute value for the rest of the decade (excepting 1963) did 
not exceed 1%. 
  
Interestingly, the positive jump in 1962 was followed by a negative one in 1963 due to a 
once-for-all jump in the annual inflation rate without precedent in the immediate past 
three decades. There were evident stimuli to the one-shot increase in the inflation rate. 
                                                 
27//  The consolidation of the backlog of obligations issued in 1961 for the amount of C$124.1 
million was authorized by the Law 146 of 1961. As for the obligations issued in 1962 the consolidation 
was authorized by the laws 59 and 71 of 1962, for C$238.2 million and C$600 million respectively. 
28/  Law 71 of 1962, Article 1. Kalnins (1963) p. 444. 
29/  Missions of the IBRD, the Committee of Nine, and the IMF coincided in suggesting the 
adjustment of the exchange rate. The IMF recommended a direct devaluation of the exchange rate for 
imports to C$9 per dollar, as well as differentiated exchange rates for coffee (C$7 per dollar), and non-
traditional exports (C$8.85 per dollar). Kalnins (1963, p.135).   25
The 33% devaluation and the extraordinary financing granted to the government at the 
end of 1962 were not the only factors. A substantial wage increase of about 40% for 
most employees adopted in January 1963 added up to the exceptional inflationary 
pressures. By the end of 1963, the inflation rate had reached the height of 27.3%, when 
in the previous five years it had not surpassed 8%, and the annual change in the real 
stock of public debt passed from the extreme positive value of 7% of GDP in 1962 to 
the negative one of 1.8% of GDP in 1963. Both changes were the result of extraordinary 
events in 1962-63 which altered the shape of the series of internal debt. 
  
  
4. Public debt and economic development. 
  
  
Leading changes in the internal public debt during the 1960s were linked to ideas of 
social reform, development and social security. Table 72 shows the importance gained 
over the years by the Economic Development Bonds (EDB), the Agrarian Bonds, and 
the Social Security Bonds. The EDB constituted a permanent resource of government 
financing through the 1960s. The bonds issued under Class B reached their major 
importance not only for their magnitude but because they were directly placed on the 
capital market; by 1965 these bonds represented 97% of total EDB issues, and by 1969 
still represented a clear majority with 68% of total issues. The remaining classes were 




In practice, the EDB represented a new instrument for the financing of the national 
government deficit rather than a mechanism for the financing of specific projects. 
Although increasingly used between 1960 and 1962, and again since 1966, there were 
no new issues in 1963-1965 (Table 72, D). During this last period authorities turned to 
the issue of securities of forced investment by the banking system -National Internal 
Bonds of 1963 (Table 72, C.)-, and by the end of the decade both the EDB and these 
forced securities were the main bonds applied to the financing of the budget deficit. 
Altogether, they amounted to 33% of the bonds in circulation in 1969. 
  
The Agrarian Bonds were continuously issued since 1962 for the financing of a program 
of land reform launched in 1961. Since 1963 these securities were the most important 
single public bonds with some 35% of total outstanding bonds. By the end of the 
decade, it was also clear that social security issues were representing about 20% of 
bonds in circulation. Altogether, these leading social programs concentrated more than a 
half of total bonds at the end of the 1960s. 
  
How important were these bonds between the extraordinary changes of 1962 and the 
end of the decade? First, according to Table 72, V., the nominal stock of internal debt 
increased by C$4682 million, which resulted from a net increase of bonds and financial 
system loans of C$5148 million and an amortization of promissory notes by C$466 
million. The issues of both the agrarian and social bonds represented 35% of the net 
increases of bonds and financial system loans. The remaining 65% was shared by two 
                                                 
30/  The original intention of authorities was to sell the Economic Development Bonds only in the 
open market, discarding financing by the Bank of the Republic. Memoria de Hacienda, 1960, p.262. 
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main sources of financing, namely, by bonds with 23% -the EDB issues on their own 
amounted to 9%-, and by credits of the financial system with 42%. 
  
Most of the credits of the financial system (90%) were granted by the Bank of the 
Republic, and as in 1962, they largely corresponded to conversions of external debts 
into internal debts, and to the financing of the losses of the Special Exchange Account, 
and not to direct loans to the government; in fact, while direct loans did not represent 
more than 5% of the Bank's credit in the 1960s, the debt substitutions amounted to 60%, 
and the financing of exchange losses to 35%. 
  
In conclusion, the securities launched in the 1960s with specific purposes of economic 
and social development amounted to a significant one-third of the increases in public 
debt. However, the predominant changes in internal public debt were associated with 
developments in the external sector, which led to substitutions of internal for external 
debt, and to charge to the internal debt the losses of the central bank in foreign exchange 
operations. 
TABLE 72
INTERNAL  PUBLIC  DEBT
PERIOD 1960 - 1969
(Millions of Pesos)
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
I. BONDS
A. Salt Mines Conversion Bonds 85,1 81,8 118,2 114,1 109,4 151,9 137,3 130,5 121,6 114,4
B. 5% Consolidated National Bonds 371,1 347,3 329,2 312,9 284,8 260 235,3 213,9 183,9 157,8
C. National Internal Debt Bonds
8% 1945 and 1957 52,9 42 30,2 17,7 3,9
8% Law 21 of 1963 272 308 360,9 391,7 481,9 578,2
8% Decree 2466 of 1965
D. Economic Development Bonds
8 1/2% Classes A-B, 1960-61-62 68,5 186,5 296,2 268,5 239,2 206,8 173,1 143,7 111,4 71,6
8 1/2% Classes B-C, 1965 162,5 156 149,2 134
5% Class D, 1965 59,4 59,4 50,4
8 1/2% Class B, 1966 71,1 69,7 63,9
11 1/2% Classes B-E, 1967-68-69 244,5 428,6
Agrarian Bonds
7% Class A, 1962-68 200 384,4 561,7 729,5 887,1 839,8 789,1 927,2
2% Class B, 1962 19,2 18,6 17,9 17,3 16,6 15,9 15,5
7% Class B, 1967-68 174,4 361,1
ial Security Bonds
Non bearing interest bonds 45,1 62 47,9 46,3 42,7
6% Constant Value Bonds 149,1 390,5 664
G. Other Bonds
5% Urban Transport Bonds 37,7 35,3 31,8
8% Cattle raising Bonds 60 60 60
6% Pro-Colombia Bonds 31,3 59,8 55,4
Non interest bearing certificates 60,7 73,1 71,2 67,7 60,9 200,3 192,6
Other Securities 2,8 2,7 2,8 2,6 7 6,5 27,4 24,7 22,2
H. Total - Bonds 580,4 660,39 7 6 ,6 1180,11 5 6 9 ,7 1790,42 1 0 9 ,7 2437 3217,9 3971,4 
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TABLE 72
(CONTINUED)
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
II. PROMISSORY NOTES
A. Public Order and Rehabilitation 143 451,5 695,8 689,9 578,5 554,3 520,9 487,4 456,6 426
B. Funding Short-term debts, Law 71/62 962,3 963,4 950,2 907,9 880,6 853,4 782,4 766,6
C. Total - Promissory Notes 143 451,5 1658,1 1653,3 1528,7 1462,2 1401,5 1340,8 1239 1192,6
III. FINANCIAL SYSTEM LOANS
A. Bank of the Republic 42,3 962,3 973 1482 2234 1935 2756 2744 2904
B. Other financial institutions 30,8 36,6 33,3 32,8 29,3 32,7 54,6 256,7 244,8 234,8
C. Total - Financial System Loans 30,8 78,9 995,6 1005,8 1511,3 2266,7 1989,6 3012,7 2988,8 3138,8
IV. FLOATING DEBT 52,6 73,4 60,4 35 42,6 153,2 190,8 154,8 112,5 69,8
V. TOTAL INTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT 806,8 1264,1 3690,7 3874,2 4652,3 5672,5 5691,6 6945,3 7558,2 8372,6
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